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People’s responses to the threat posed by COVID-19 varied widely. In direct contradiction
to the popular theory that Trump supporters prefer to submit to powerful people, Trump’s
most enthusiastic followers actually were the most vocal in resisting the urgings of
authorities to get vaccinated and to wear masks. I explain this anomaly by showing that
Trump’s followers are driven less by a desire for authority and more by a desire to be
secure from the threats human outsiders pose to society’s historically dominant racial,
language, religious, and cultural group. Far from being authoritarians, the followers of
leaders such as Donald Trump stridently oppose all authority ﬁgures who divert attention
from what they believe are the real threats: immigrants, powerful foreign enemies,
diversity, terrorists, and criminals. From this perspective, it is unsurprising that those with
a securitarian orientation would not take seriously authorities who are concerned with
the threat posed by an mRNA virus.
Keywords: COVID-19, Trump supporters, anti-vaccine, securitarians, authoritarians

INTRODUCTION
As of June 2022, the COVID-19 virus in the United States had infected perhaps 100 million people,
had overwhelmed hospitals and medical staﬀs across the country, and had killed over 1 million
Americans. Vaccines and masks, though demonstrably eﬀective in mitigating contraction of the
disease and especially in reducing the severity of its symptoms, were nonetheless actively and
vociferously resisted by large numbers of people. This concerted resistance led many observers
to the realization that astounding medical advances such as the development of targeted, fullysynthetic mRNA vaccines in a matter of months amount to little absent an improved understanding
of people’s behavioral proclivities. For example, outgoing National Institutes of Health Director
Francis Collins, when asked what he might have done diﬀerently during his tenure, had this to
say: “To have now 60 million people still holding oﬀ of taking advantage of lifesaving vaccines is
pretty unexpected. It does make me, at least, realize, ‘Boy, there are things about human behavior
that I don’t think we had invested enough into understanding”’ (Simmons-Duﬃn, 2021). Quite
so. Can political science and political psychology help? Perhaps, but to this point eﬀorts have been
hindered by terminological confusion and misguided assumptions. The goal of this article is to
provide evidence on the nature and motivation of those who were unwilling to be vaccinated and
more generally to take precautions against the spread of COVID-19.
Who exactly are the—to use Collins’s estimate at the time−60 million Americans who were
vaccine hesitant or in many cases outright vaccine resistant? Of course, with that large a number
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Nightmare” (Dean and Altemeyer, 2020); “Trump’s America and
the Rise of the Authoritarian Personality” (Linden, 2017); “The
Rise of Trump: American’s Authoritarian Spring” (MacWilliams,
2016); “Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian
Populism” (Norris and Inglehart, 2019); and “The Rise of
American Authoritarianism” (Taub, 2016).
The puzzle then is this. How can the very people who allegedly
are most eager to follow powerful authorities immediately
reject the edicts and encouragements of medical, professional,
and political authorities, including the head of the Centers
for Disease Control, the head of the National Institutes for
Health, the President of the United States, most governors
and mayors, and even on occasion former President Donald
Trump himself? Of course, the events of January 6, 2021, during
which thousands of Trump supporters staged an insurrection
against police at the U.S. Capitol, with some even expressing
a desire to hang the Republican Vice-President, raise further
questions about the wisdom of applying the “authoritarian” label
to Trump supporters.
Those persisting in the belief that Trump supporters are
authoritarians attempt to get around this blatant contradiction
by claiming that his followers only attach themselves to
those authorities they believe to be “legitimate”—the
latest iteration of a terminological trick ﬁrst suggested by
Altemeyer (1988, p. 4). In this case, the argument is that, because
Trump supporters do not see authorities such as Anthony
Fauci, Joe Biden, and Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer
as legitimate, they are free to denigrate, disrespect, disobey, and
perhaps even plot to kidnap them. Such an argument, however, is
mindlessly circular at best and misleadingly dangerous at worst.
By this logic, those of us who get vaccinated and wear masks also
are authoritarians because we follow the encouragements and
occasional mandates of those authorities in the scientiﬁc and
political communities who we happen to perceive as legitimate.
The reason this line of thinking does not work is that real
authoritarian followers take pleasure in submitting to authority
ﬁgures regardless of the speciﬁc actions the authority ﬁgure is
advocating. Those individuals who follow the edicts of authorities
only if those authorities are urging them to engage in a particular
substantive behavior are not really desirous of authority but
rather of particular actions and outcomes, and they should be
labeled as such. Thus, in order to understand why Trump’s strong
supporters are prone to anti-vaccine and anti-mask sentiments
and behaviors, we must ﬁrst understand their broader objectives
for the structure of society and its public policies.

there can be no single proﬁle. We know that some were
on the political left, perhaps espousing a naturalist approach
to medicine that spurns artiﬁcial laboratory vaccines; others
were young, perhaps ﬁtness-conscious, individuals who believed
themselves to be indestructible; and still others, perhaps without
a clear agenda, simply did not get around to being vaccinated.
Still, though the diversity of the vaccine resistant population
should not be underestimated, the fact remains that the lion’s
share identiﬁed themselves with the political right and, more
speciﬁcally, as supporters of politicians such as former President
Donald Trump.
Writing in late 2021, New York Times columnist David
Leonhardt noted that “In the U.S., partisanship is the biggest
factor determining vaccination rates. If Democratic voters made
up their own country, it would be one of the world’s most
vaccinated, with more than 91 percent of adults having received
at least one shot. Only about 60 percent of Republican adults
have done so.” Leonhardt goes on to cite data indicating that as
of November 2021, the “reddest” tenth of all U.S. counties saw
death rates from coronavirus six times higher than the “bluest”
tenth of counties and the political gap appeared to be widening
as the pandemic persisted (Leonhardt, 2021; see also Galston,
2021). Other studies report similar ﬁndings. One states that
“counties with higher levels of Trump support suﬀered relatively
higher death rates” even after controlling for such factors as age,
proximity to hospitals, and population density in the county (Gao
and Radford, 2021, p. 224). And another ﬁnds similarly that,
in the second half of 2021, people living in counties that voted
heavily for Donald Trump have been nearly 3 times as likely to die
from COVID-19 as those living in counties that voted for Biden
(Wood and Brumﬁel, 2021).
What explains this connection between right-of-center
political orientation and anti-vaccine attitudes? Some assert that
if Republican leaders such as Donald Trump had not played
down the severity of the pandemic and had refrained from
making false claims about alternative treatment approaches, their
supporters would have willingly signed up for the vaccines
(Wright, 2021). This explanation, however, does not account
for the fact that their hero, former President Trump, played an
important role in developing the vaccines and that, on those rare
occasions when he (tepidly) encouraged people to get vaccinated
he was booed lustily by his supporters (Slisco, 2021). In addition,
the connection of anti-vaccine attitudes and right-wing political
beliefs is common around the world and not conﬁned to fans of
Donald Trump in the United States. No, the reluctance of certain
individuals to receive the vaccine and otherwise take COVID19 seriously runs much deeper than an inclination of a group of
Americans to do whatever Donald Trump says.
The Trump-supporter-anti-vaccine connection becomes even
more mystifying in light of the common allegation that the
Trumpian right is primarily composed of “authoritarians”—that
is, individuals who, according to the dictionary, “favor strict
obedience to authority at the expense of personal freedom.”
Examples of the remarkable number of scholarly and journalistic
works claiming that Trump supporters are authoritarians
include: “Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of
Authoritarianism” (Applebaum, 2020); “The Authoritarian
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SECURITARIANS, NOT AUTHORITARIANS
If Trump’s core supporters are not authoritarians, what are they?
I assert that they are securitarians—individuals who believe the
noblest and most essential task of a human being is to protect
person, family, culture, and country from the tangible threats
posed by outsiders—people who do not contribute to the unity
and security of the cultural core. As securitarians see it, relative
to those constituting the cultural core, outsiders are those who
have diﬀerent appearances, diﬀerent religions, diﬀerent cultural
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compiled a demographically representative sample of voting age
adults in the U.S. In identifying the real motivations of strong
Trump supporters, I will rely primarily on the more recent 2020
survey and the COVID-related items it included but the 2019
survey is also valuable in that it included several of the
traditionally-employed “authoritarian” items as well
as numerous items that are central to identifying
securitarian orientations.
Standard authoritarian items are often criticized because they
conﬂate authoritarian sentiments with right-of-center political
beliefs. In fact, authoritarianism is sometimes called “rightwing” authoritarianism and the items used to tap it frequently
include references to such hot button political issues as “abortion
rights,” “school prayer,” “homosexuals,” “feminists,” and “radical,
immoral people who try to ruin [society] for their own godless
purposes” (Altemeyer, 1981). The unfortunate result is that these
items are unsuited for determining whether Trump’s strongest
supporters are authoritarians or whether they simply oppose
abortion, homosexuality, feminists, and “radical, godless people.”
Those scholars eager for a way to measure authoritarian
tendencies separate from conservative stances on policy issues
have wisely settled on items tapping attitudes for child rearing
(see Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005; Hetherington and Weiler,
2009). The logic of this approach is that someone who
believes “children should be raised to be obedient rather than
to be self-reliant” and “to have good manners rather than
to be independent” is quite appropriately labeled as having
authoritarian tendencies. Given the value of this measurement
approach, the 2019 survey included several child-rearing items
that have been previously employed to tap authoritarianism.
Securitarianism, on the other hand, places value not on
authority per se but rather on strength at both the personal
and national levels, as well as vigilance and military might. It
is measured here with the following four items: “Just about the
worst thing a person could do is project weakness;” “our country’s
central goal should be strength;” “if we are not vigilant, we will
quickly be victimized by criminals, immigrants, and by the power
of foreign countries;” and “it is possible for a country to be truly
great without being militarily strong” (reverse coded). My core
expectation is that strong Trump supporters will be distinguished
not so much by their attitudes toward authority (the child-rearing
items) but rather by the value they place on personal strength,
national strength, vigilance against outsiders, and military might.
To identify Trump’s strongest supporters, I used the following
item: “Donald Trump is one of the very best presidents in
the entire history of our country.” (As with all the items
described herein, respondents chose between ﬁve options:
strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, and
strongly agree.) Strongly agreeing that Trump is one of the best
presidents ever is a high bar, going well beyond simply voting
for or expressing support for Trump. Many conservatives, even
Trump voters, may not be willing to go so far as to assert that
Trump ranks right up there with Washington and Lincoln but it
seems valid to label those who are willing to go that far as Trump’s
strongest supporters, what I like to call his venerators.
On the basis of this “one of the greatest president
ever” item as well as the standard “are you a liberal,

practices, diﬀerent skin colors, diﬀerent respect for societal
norms, diﬀerent languages, and/or diﬀerent national origins.
Securitarians also are bothered by those individuals who, though
part of the demographically dominant group, for whatever
misguided reason, are not eager to defend insiders in the face
of outsider threats. These fellow travelers may even facilitate
outsider threats by encouraging immigration, lax national and
personal defenses, and lenient treatment of those committing
crimes against societal insiders (Hibbing, 2020).
Securitarians in the United States are convinced that all
the vestiges of insiderism are under threat: Christianity, the
English language, whiteness, farmers, the police, small businesses,
the national anthem, and pride in America’s history. The
multifaceted nature of the insider-outsider divide helps to
account for the surprising number of racial minorities who
supported Donald Trump. Respect for the dominant religion
(Christianity), the dominant sexual orientation (straight), the
dominant cultural practices (non-Muslim), and the dominant
language (English), not to mention respect for those who are nonimmigrants can sometimes counterbalance failure to belong to
the dominant racial group (white).
Securitarians believe that vigilance against human outsider
threats is essential and they have diﬃculty understanding how
anyone could be cavalier in the face of the threats that seem
so obvious and imminent to them. From the perspective of a
securitarian, political leaders, particularly in recent years, have
been far too eager to assist (rather than restrain) outsiders
by giving American tax dollars to foreign countries, by being
receptive to non-insider practices and customs, by being
welcoming to immigrants, and by not being ﬁrm in punishing
people who disobey insider-protecting norms and rules.
In direct contrast to authoritarians, if given the choice between
submission to authority and personal freedom, securitarians
choose personal freedom and they do so with alacrity. After all,
without freedom, securitarians might not be able to pursue an
agenda they see as existential: ensuring their own personal safety
(by, among other things, defending the right to bear arms) and
the security of what they see as their culture (by, among other
things, discouraging diversity).
If I am correct that the avid Trump supporters who oppose
COVID-19 mitigation strategies are securitarians rather than
authoritarians, it becomes easier to explain why they can be
so resistant to the entreaties of those authorities the pandemic
has rendered salient. The only remaining task is to demonstrate
with appropriate empirical data that fervid Trump supporters
harbor the securitarian dispositions that I have attributed to them
rather than the authoritarian inclinations attributed to them by so
many others.

DATA AND METHODS
To do so I will draw on two novel surveys that were conducted
for me by the international polling ﬁrm YouGov. The ﬁrst
went to the ﬁeld in the early summer of 2019 (N = 1,000)
and the second in the early fall of 2020 (N = 1,200), well into
the COVID-19 pandemic. For each of these surveys, YouGov
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moderate, or conservative” item (similar ﬁndings are obtained
if party identiﬁcation is substituted for ideology), I divided
the demographically representative YouGov sample into four
groups: those who identiﬁed themselves as liberals; those
who identiﬁed themselves as moderates, those who identiﬁed
themselves as conservatives but who did not strongly agree
that Trump was one of the best presidents ever (in the
tables, these individuals are labeled as NTVCs—non-Trumpvenerating-conservatives), and ﬁnally those who did in fact
strongly agree that Trump was one of the best presidents
ever (in the tables, these individuals are labeled as Trump’s
vener., short for Trump venerators). Of particular interest is
the diﬀerence in responses between those who are Trump
venerators and then those who are conservative but not Trump
venerators (NTVCs).
In fact, given the importance of this comparison, in addition
to presenting the percent agreeing with the various survey
items across the four categories mentioned above, in the last
column of the tables I present the size (and signiﬁcance level)
of the diﬀerence in responses between the NTVCs and the
Trump venerators. This was calculated by focusing only on
those respondents who self-identiﬁed as conservative and/or
strongly agreed that Trump was one of the “very best presidents
ever” and then computing the correlation of a dummy variable
(Trump venerator or not) with response to the item in question
(for example, whether the respondent strongly agreed, agreed,
neither agreed nor disagreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed
that children should be raised to be obedient rather than selfreliant). This procedure has the advantage of incorporating the
complete range of information on responses whereas the ﬁrst
four columns of the table merely report percent agreeing/strongly
agreeing. (In fact, because the ﬁrst four columns simply report
the percent agreeing while the last column incorporates strength
of agreement or disagreement, for several of the items the size
of the correlations sometimes do not appear to match the size
of the gap in percent agreeing across the categories.) As such
the numbers in the last column provide a summary measure
of the degree to which Trump venerators and NTVCs are
diﬀerent (and how conﬁdent we can be that those diﬀerences
are real) across the entire range of possible responses to the
pertinent survey item. Positive values indicate that, compared to
NTVCs, the responses of Trump venerators were higher in degree

of agreement; negative values indicate that Trump venerators’
responses were lower in degree of agreement. The standard
YouGov weights were employed throughout these analyses.
In accord with the discussion just concluded, the three
hypotheses tested here are:
H1 : Trump venerators are distinguished from conservatives
who are not Trump venerators more by their desire for
strength and security than by their desire for authoritarianism.
H2 : Trump venerators are distinguished from conservatives
who are not Trump venerators more by their fear of human
outsiders than by their fear of amorphous, non-human threats.
H3: Trump venerators are distinguished from conservatives
who are not Trump venerators more by their stances
on security issues than by their stances on social or
economic issues.

TRUMP VENERATORS AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD COVID
Before testing these three hypotheses, an important preliminary
step is to document that Trump venerators in particular harbor
cavalier attitudes toward COVID. Previous analyses (e.g., those
cited above) tend to use aggregate data to make points such
as death rates from COVID tend to be higher in counties that
voted for Trump. It is important here to demonstrate that similar
patterns are present in individual-level survey data.
To this end, I conducted a simple regression analysis. The
dependent variable was derived from a 2020 survey items stating
“I feel threatened by COVID-19” (strongly agree = 5; agree = 4;
neither agree nor disagree = 3; disagree = 2; strongly disagree
= 1). As independent variables, I included several standard
demographics: age, female, and educational level attained (I also
repeated the analyses with income included but the results were
similar and the number of cases much reduced because of the
number of respondents who prefer not to disclose their family
income.) Most importantly, I also included self-reported ideology
(5 = strongly conservative; 4 = conservative; 3 = moderate; 2
= liberal; 1 = strongly liberal) and the Trump veneration item
described above. The central expectation here is that the Trump
veneration item will be strongly and negatively related to fear of
COVID-19 even after controlling for demographics and ideology.
The results of the regression are presented in Table 1.
None of the coeﬃcients for the demographic variables has
a signiﬁcant eﬀect of fear of COVID-19. Self-reported ideology
does not either when Trump veneration is included in the model.
The key to understanding who is least likely to fear COVID-19
is not age or sex or education or holding a conservative political
ideology; it is whether or not individuals are enthusiastically part
of Trump’s base, even to the extent of believing him to be on a par
with George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. The evidence is
clear: avid Trump backers tend to not be fearful of COVID-19.
This being established, the central task becomes understanding
what drives individuals to belong to Trump’s base. I believe the
explanation is to be found in the presence of securitarian rather
than authoritarian attitudes.

TABLE 1 | Explaining variation in fear of COVID-19.
Variable

“b”

Beta

Sign.

Age

0.007

0.001

0.98

Female

0.029

0.012

0.80

Education level

−0.028

−0.040

0.47

Ideology (conservative)

−0.069

−0.042

0.11

Trump veneration

−0.270

−0.341

0.01

Dependent variable = “I feel threatened by COVID-19”.
N = 392; R2 = 0.15; Adj. R2 = 0.14; F = 13.21; p < 0.001.
Source: 2020 YouGov Survey.
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TABLE 2 | Authoritarian and securitarian items and Trump veneration.
Authoritarian items
Children should be raised to…

% agreeing
liberals

% agreeing
moderates

% agreeing
NTVCs#

% agreeing
Trump vener.∧

Correlation of
difference b/w
NTVCs and
Trump vener.

Be obedienta

17

37

41

38

−0.03

Respect eldersb

47

72

76

76

0.00

Follow authorityc

34

62

72

74

0.02

Be well-behavedd

18

37

37

38

0.01

Have good mannerse

39

64

67

72

0.06
0.17**

Securitarian items
The worst a person could do is project weakness

27

37

42

60

Our country’s central goal should be strength

29

50

73

88

0.25**

If we are not vigilante we will be victims

18

36

72

88

0.23**

A country can be great without military strength

65

41

31

21

−0.18**

a Rather

than be self-reliant.
than be independent.
c Rather than challenge authority.
d Rather than be considerate.
e Rather than be curious.
**sign. (p < 0.01).
#NTVCs = non-Trump-venerating conservatives.
∧ Trump vener. (venerators) = those strongly agreeing Trump is one of the best presidents ever.
Source: 2019 YouGov Survey.
N = 888 (275 liberals; 257 moderates; 186 NTVCs; and 170 Trump venerators).
b Rather

AUTHORITARIAN VS. SECURITARIAN
SENTIMENTS

what we found when focusing on the authoritarianism items,
Trump venerators are very diﬀerent from conservatives who do
not venerate Trump.
Those in Trump’s base are 18 points more likely to agree that
personal weakness is terrible, 16 points more likely to agree that
we need to be vigilant, 15 points more likely to agree that a
country’s central goal should be strength, and 10 points less likely
to believe a country can be great without being militarily strong.
All of these diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
An alternative methodology also illustrates the comparative
advantage of the securitarian items. This approach simply
correlates the “Trump is one of the best Presidents ever” item
with the ﬁve childrearing items and then the four securitarian
items. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.
These correlations are consistent with the results presented in
Table 2. As expected, the authoritarian items correlate positively
and signiﬁcantly with Trump veneration but the size of the
correlations is generally modest—never higher than 0.22—and
the index of the ﬁve items correlates with Trump veneration at
only 0.31. In contrast, the correlations of the four securitarian
items with Trump veneration are always substantially higher than
the correlations of the authoritarian items. In fact, the index of
the four securitarian items correlates with Trump veneration at
0.60, nearly double that of the index of the authoritarian items.
With regard to reliability and validity, the Chronbach’s alpha
of the four securitarian items is over 0.7 (for purposes of
comparison, the Chronbach’s alpha of the ﬁve childrearing
items is just under 0.6) and even at that is held down

In Table 2, I present data on responses to ﬁve child-rearing
items and then the four securitarian items. Turning ﬁrst to
the authoritarian items, it is clear that attitudes on the whole
tend to become more authoritarian as attention shifts from
the left of the political spectrum to the right. Only 17% of
liberals prioritized obedience over self-reliance but 41% of nonTrump-venerating conservatives and 38% of Trump venerators
did. This overall pattern is repeated for the other authoritarian
items and this is not surprising. But if we focus only on
the two columns connoting right-of-center attitudes the story
becomes more interesting in that there is hardly any diﬀerence.
In other words, Trump’s hardcore base—his venerators—are not
any more authoritarian than conservatives who do not idolize
Trump. The diﬀerence between these two columns across the ﬁve
child-rearing authoritarianism items is never more than a couple
of points and never comes close to being statistically signiﬁcant.
Authoritarian attitudes do not distinguish Trump’s base from
conservatives who do not venerate Trump.
The story is quite diﬀerent, however, when we shift to the
securitarian items in the bottom half of the table. Here we again
see diﬀerences between the left and the right—in fact, some of the
spreads between liberals and Trump venerators are massive (70
points for the “vigilance against outsiders” item and 59 points for
the “national strength” item). The key point, however, pertains to
comparisons of NTVCs and Trump venerators and here, unlike
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threatening. Scholars have long been interested in the possibility
that threat sensitivity varies across the political spectrum (e.g.,
Oxley et al., 2008). One theory is that, compared to those on the
political left, those on the right side of the political spectrum are
in a general sense more threat sensitive, but more recent thinking
(e.g., Hibbing, 2020) holds that variations in threat sensitivity
are contingent on the speciﬁc type of threat being referenced.
Pursuing this latter line of thought makes it possible to enhance
understanding of the seemingly non-chalant attitude of so many
strong Trump supporters toward COVID-19 as well as the need
for mitigation strategies. The 2020 YouGov survey included a
series of items asking respondents about the degree to which
they felt each of a range of entities and situations, including
COVID-19, posed a threat.
The results are presented in Table 4, where the overall format
is identical to that found in Table 2 except now respondents
are not asked whether they agree or disagree with various
authoritarian or securitarian statements but rather whether they
“feel threatened by” each of the various possibilities listed in
the table.
Again, we see large diﬀerences between the left side of the
political spectrum and the right. Given the overall contours of
political debate in the modern era, these diﬀerences are to be
expected. Compared to Trump venerators, liberals are 59 points
more likely to report feeling threatened by “the harm being
done to the environment,” 55 points more likely to report feeling
threatened by the income gap, and 47 points more likely to
report feeling threatened by “people without healthcare.” No
surprise here.
If, however, the focus is narrowed to diﬀerences in felt threat
between NTVCs and Trump venerators the results are markedly
more surprising and instructive. Parallel to Table 2, the last
column of Table 4 reports and size (and signiﬁcance level) of
the diﬀerence in NTVC and Trump venerator responses. In fact,
I have used the value of the resulting coeﬃcients to order the
various potential threats in the table.
People on the political right are hardly of a piece in the degree
to which they ﬁnd various entities and situations threatening.
More speciﬁcally, we see that, compared to NTVCs, Trump
venerators are signiﬁcantly (p < 0.01) more likely to report
feeling threatened by “the might of countries such as China”
(r = 0.22), criminals (0.16), terrorists (0.15), and immigrants
(0.12). For all of the other potential threats, however, Trump
venerators either are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from NTVCs
or are signiﬁcantly LESS threatened. Note that even on what
would appear to be the least politically charged referent—natural
disasters—Trump venerators are signiﬁcantly less threatened
than NTVCs—and especially than liberals.
The key ﬁnding is that the four potential threats felt most
acutely by Trump venerators are China, criminals, terrorists,
and immigrants. These are precisely the kinds of threats on
which securitarians ﬁxate: outsiders and those who do not play
by the rules. Things such as natural disasters, environmental
harm, the income gap, and a lack of healthcare are not
particularly bothersome to Trump venerators—in fact, relative to
individuals with other political beliefs they tend to be dismissive
of these threats.

TABLE 3 | Authoritarian and securitarian items’ correlation with Trump veneration.
Children should be raised to…

Bivariate correlation Signiﬁcance
with Trump
veneration

Authoritarian items
Be obedienta

0.13

p < 0.01

Respect eldersb

0.20

p < 0.01

Follow authorityc

0.22

p < 0.01

Be well-behavedd

0.18

p < 0.01

Have good mannerse

0.21

p < 0.01

Additive index of the childrearing items

0.31

p < 0.01

The worst a person could do is project
weakness

0.30

p < 0.01

Our country’s central goal should be
strength

0.46

p < 0.01

If we are not vigilante we will be victims

0.57

p < 0.01

A country can be great without military
strength. (reverse coded)

0.39

p < 0.01

Additive index of the securitarian items

0.60

p < 0.01

Securitarian items

a Rather

than be self-reliant.
than be independent.
than challenge authority.
d Rather than be considerate.
e Rather than be curious.
Trump veneration: “Donald Trump is one of the best presidents in the history of the
country.” 5 = strongly agree; 4 = agree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 2 = disagree; 1
= strongly disagree.
Source: 2019 YouGov Survey (N = 999).
b Rather
c Rather

by the fact that one of the items (the ﬁrst) refers to
personal strength while the other three refer to the society
or country. Similar securitarian indices focusing exclusively
on societal concerns have a Chronbach’s alpha of 0.89 and,
in terms of validity, securitarian indices outperform more
established authoritarian-relevant indices when tasked with
explaining the diﬀerences between Trump venerators and nonTrump-venerating conservatives. When the societal securitarian
index is included in multivariate models alongside right-wing
authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO),
and an index of the child-rearing items, the standardized
coeﬃcients for RWA, SDO, and the childrearing items are
much smaller than the coeﬃcient for the securitarian index
and all three fail to achieve statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05
level while the coeﬃcient for the societal securitarian battery
is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (Hibbing, 2020, p. 158–159).
In sum, Trump venerators are not any more authoritarian
than conservatives who do not venerate Trump but they are
signiﬁcantly more securitarian.

FELT THREAT
Contrasting variations in responses to authoritarian and
securitarian items is not the only way to highlight the diﬀerences
between Trump venerators and others. Diﬀerences may also
appear in the particular entities and situations perceived to be
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TABLE 4 | Differences in felt threat.
I feel threatened by…

% agreeing
liberals

% agreeing
moderates

% agreeing
NTVCs #

% agreeing
Trump vener.∧

Correlation of
difference b/w
NTVCs and
Trump vener.

China

29

41

59

78

0.22**

Criminals

38

60

77

86

0.16**

Terrorists

35

48

57

75

0.15**

Immigrants

8

12

28

44

0.12**

People w/o healthcare

74

53

30

27

−0.07

Income gap

85

58

34

30

−0.11*

Natural disasters

66

58

46

38

−0.11*

Environmental harm

91

73

40

32

−0.13**

COVID-19

81

63

45

31

−0.17**

* sign. (p < 0.05).
** sign. (p < 0.01).
#NTVCs = non-Trump-venerating conservatives.
∧ Trump vener. (venerators) = those strongly agreeing Trump is one of the best presidents ever.
Source: 2020 YouGov Survey.
N = 1,093 (366 liberals; 356 moderates; 161 NTVCs; and 210 Trump venerators).

payments, small government, government-arranged healthcare,
and taxing the rich. Finally, the last three issues—legalizing
marijuana, abortion rights, and gay marriage—all concern hot
button social matters.
My expectation is that the issues that most distinguish
Trump venerators from other individuals and especially from
other individuals on the political right (i.e., NTVCs) are the
securitarian rather than economic and social issues.
The results are found in Table 5 and, similar to those in
Table 4, are drawn from the 2020 survey. Once again, the
expected diﬀerences between the political left and political right
are obvious. It would have been shocking if, compared to those on
the right side of the spectrum, liberals were not signiﬁcantly more
supportive of abortion rights, legalizing marijuana, taxing the
rich, and government healthcare and signiﬁcantly less supportive
of small government, the death penalty, and defense spending.
Focusing on diﬀerences conﬁned to the right side of the
political ledger is more edifying. On average, Trump venerators
always display preferences that are more conservative than
NTVCs but the degree of diﬀerence varies widely. The biggest
diﬀerences between NTVCs and Trump venerators are always on
the securitarian issues and the smallest are always on the social
issues (in fact, one of the social issues—legalizing marijuana—
does not even reach statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level).
Diﬀerences between NTVCs and Trump venerators on the
economic issues are usually signiﬁcant and sometimes sizable but
the coeﬃcients are never as large as they are for the securitarian
issues at the top of the table. Moreover, with regard to the
economic issues, it could be argued that, to a large extent,
Trump venerators are attracted to policies such as lowering taxes,
reducing welfare payments, and shrinking government because
they believe government to be too generous to “outsiders” such
as racial minorities, immigrants, and foreign countries. In other
words, to a certain degree, Trump venerators are likely to see
many economic issues through a securitarian lens. Even at this,

On this point, the perceived threat posed by COVID-19 is
particularly relevant and here we ﬁnd that Trump venerators
are 14 points less likely than conservatives who do not venerate
Trump to agree that they feel threatened by COVID-19—and 50
points less likely than liberals. No doubt the fact that Trump
venerators do not feel more threatened by COVID-19 is an
important reason so many Trump venerators were reluctant to
get the vaccine and/or to “mask up.” The only threats Trump
venerators tend to take seriously are those posed by human
outsiders who are believed to threaten the core of America.
Other threats, such as mRNA viruses, natural disasters, and
environmental degradation, do not ﬁt into this category so are
not of much concern. In fact, Trump venerators may worry
that a focus on these diﬀuse, non-human threats will distract
societal attention from the threats that they feel in their bones:
the threats posed by immigrants, terrorists, diversity, criminals,
and foreign powers.

POLICY STANCES
Finally, if I am correct that Trump venerators are driven by
securitarian concerns, they should hold policy preferences that
distinguish them from others, even from others on the political
right. This hypothesis is tested in Table 5. The format of this
table is the same as that found in Tables 2, 4; however, it reports
results from items addressing the degree to which respondents
agreed with a series of twelve issue positions. I have placed the
issues into three groups. The ﬁrst ﬁve reﬂect securitarian issues:
defense spending, English as a national language, gun rights,
reducing immigration, and the death penalty. All ﬁve of these
ﬁt squarely within the securitarian vision in that four pertain
to security from outsiders/norm violators and the ﬁfth (English
as a national language) involves protection of a longstanding
core element of American culture. The next group of ﬁve
items deals with economic issues: lower taxes, reducing welfare

Frontiers in Political Science | www.frontiersin.org

7

July 2022 | Volume 4 | Article 880798

Hibbing

Securitarians, Not Authoritarians

TABLE 5 | Differences in policy preferences.
Issue positions

% agreeing
liberals

% agreeing
moderates

% agreeing
NTVCs#

% agreeing
Trump vener.∧

Correlation of
difference b/w
NTVCs and
Trump vener.

Defense spending

15

27

52

83

0.34**

English national language

33

57

86

96

0.31**

Gun rights

27

50

76

93

0.29**

Reduce immigration

13

26

61

80

0.27**

Death penalty

28

40

63

83

0.26**

Lower taxes

31

52

71

84

0.22**

Reduce welfare

11

27

56

70

0.15**

Small government

22

43

67

75

0.14**

Gov.-arranged healthcare

84

53

23

19

−0.13**

Tax the rich

89

63

38

30

−0.08

Legalize marijuana

80

58

42

40

−0.02

Abortion rights

85

62

30

24

−0.11*

Gay marriage

83

64

29

27

−0.12*

* sign. (p < 0.05).
** sign. (p < 0.01).
#NTVCs = non-Trump-venerating conservatives.
∧ Trump vener. (venerator) = those strongly agreeing Trump is one of the best presidents ever.
Source: 2020 YouGov Survey.
N = 1,093 (366 liberals; 356 moderates; 161 NTVCs; and 210 Trump venerators).

board, Trump venerators, compared to non-Trump-venerating
conservatives, report being signiﬁcantly LESS threatened by
natural disasters, the income gap, environmental harm. Most
relevant to this article, Trump venerators are 14 points less
likely than non-Trump-venerating conservatives to see COVID19 as a threat—a ﬁnding perfectly consistent with the public
behaviors that were so much in evidence during the pandemic.
However, when the potential threats are posed by outsiders such
as criminals, terrorists, immigrants, and the might of countries
like China, Trump venerators report being signiﬁcantly more
threatened. In sum, Trump venerators are not particularly threat
sensitive in an overall sense but they are highly sensitive to threats
posed by human outsiders.
Setting aside policy stances and perceived threats, are Trump
venerators unusual in their broader preferences for social life
and societal arrangements? To be more speciﬁc, are they
distinguished, as I hypothesized, by the degree to which they
value strength, vigilance, and security or, as so many others have
hypothesized, by their “authoritarian” tendencies—their desire
for a society based on order, authority, and obedience? The results
in Tables 2, 3 deliver a clear verdict on this matter. Compared to
non-Trump-venerating conservatives, Trump venerators are not
signiﬁcantly more likely to believe children should be raised to
be obedient, respectful, and submissive to authority but they are
signiﬁcantly more likely to value personal and national strength,
military muscle, and vigilance in the face of outsider threats.
To be fair to the existing literature, many observers use the
term “authoritarian” to refer to people who are not supportive of
democracy. If this is what is meant, then many Trump venerators
are indeed authoritarians, as is evidenced by their actions
subsequent to the 2020 election. If, however, the term is used

the issues on which Trump venerators are most diﬀerent from
others are the classic securitarian issues.

CONCLUSION
The best strategy for determining why so many strong Trump
supporters are resistant to getting vaccinated and wearing masks
is to uncover the broader motivations of this group. As an
important side beneﬁt, this approach highlights several prevalent
misconceptions regarding what it is that leads so many people to
support political candidates such as Donald Trump.
Beginning with issue preferences (Table 5), the evidence
presented here suggests the real distinguishing policy stances
of those enamored of the former President do not involve
social issues such as greater opposition to abortion rights, gay
rights, and marijuana legalization. In fact, on these issues Trump
venerators and non-Trump-venerating conservatives are hardly
diﬀerent at all. Moving to economic issues such as taxing
the rich, government arranged healthcare, and a desire for
small government, Trump venerators adopt somewhat more
conservative stances than non-Trump-venerating conservatives
but these diﬀerences are much smaller than those dealing with
securitarian issues. Even compared to individuals who label
themselves “conservative,” Trump venerators are signiﬁcantly
more likely to support gun rights, making English the national
language, increases in defense spending, and decreases in
immigration. Desires for personal and cultural security are the
deﬁning policy stances of those who venerate Trump.
Asking respondents to identify the entities and situations
they ﬁnd threatening (see Table 4) only serves to conﬁrm this
interpretation. Far from feeling more threatened across the
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more literally, to refer to people who crave authority, the data
suggest that the term is not particularly apt. Trump venerators
are often turned oﬀ rather than turned on by authority. They do
not want to replace democracy with stronger authority but rather
with less authority. Trump venerators, and securitarians more
generally, live in fear of being prevented by authorities from being
able to protect themselves and their core culture from the inroads
they believe are being made by outsiders. It is in this regard that I
question the applicability of the term “authoritarian.”
Trump venerators’ highly focused concerns help to explain
their otherwise incongruous behaviors regarding COVID-19 and
available mitigation strategies. Why were those in Trump’s orbit
so resistant to vaccines, masks, and social distancing? Because
mRNA viruses, like environmental degradation and other nonhuman threats do not fall into the category of threats that alarm
Trump venerators: those posed by human outsiders. Thus, they
see little reason to alter their behaviors, policy preferences, and
general desires for social structures and social life as a result of a
pandemic. In fact, given the degree of concern with which Trump
venerators view human outsiders, it is quite likely that they view
threats such as COVID-19 as dangerously distracting—capable of
diverting society’s eye from the real threats.
Direct evidence for this last assertion is not available but one
ﬁnal set of results from the 2020 YouGov survey is consistent
with it. The pertinent item read as follows: “let’s face it,
virtually all diseases come from foreign cultures.” Only 11%
of liberals agreed with this statement but 35% of non-Trumpvenerating conservatives and fully 44% of Trump venerators
did. In other words, Trump’s core followers were four times as
likely as liberals (and signiﬁcantly more likely than non-Trumpvenerating conservatives) to believe that diseases virtually always
come from abroad.
These divergent sentiments on the source of diseases were
reﬂected in responses to COVID-19. During the pandemic,
many Trump venerators ﬁxated on the possible culpability of
China in the initiation and spread of the virus (Silver et al.,
2020). Meanwhile, many on the political left had diﬃculty

understanding the importance of the virus’s likely origins and
were focused instead on the steps most likely to limit the damage
it was causing.
Given these attitudes, if historical accuracy was of no concern
and the sole focus had been to get more people to take the
vaccine, it may well be that dismissing suspicions regarding
China’s role in the pandemic was a mistake. On the basis of the
evidence presented here, Trump venerators probably would have
been signiﬁcantly more likely to appreciate the dangers posed
by COVID-19 and the associated need for serious prophylactic
measures if there had been universal acceptance of the narrative
that the virus was a diabolical and deliberate attempt by a
dangerous foreign power to undermine the core of American
society and the safety and security of its citizens. To put it
diﬀerently, if getting vaccinated had been framed as the best
way to thwart a dangerous threat to American security—a threat
emanating from the plans of a hostile, potent, and nefarious
foreign power—Trump venerators likely would have been the
ﬁrst in line.
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